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Armed Attack and Self-Defense

T

he general prohibition of the use offorce in the relations. between States
constitutes the cornerstone of modem international law. 1 It is currently
embedded both in the Charter of the United Nations [Article 2(4)2] and in customary intemationallaw (which has consolidated under the impact of the Charter).3 Indeed, the International Law Commission has identified the prohibition
of the use ofinter-State force as "a conspicuous example" ofjus cogens4 (i.e., a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
perrnitted5). The Commission's position was cited by the International
Court ofJ ustice in the Nicaragua case of 1986, 6 and in two Separate Opinions
the peremptory nature of the proscription of the use of inter-State force was
explicitly emphasized?
The correct interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter subsequent to the
Nicaragua Judgment is that there exists in international law today "an absolute
prohibition of the use or threat offorce, subject only to the exceptions stated
in the Charter itsel£"8 The only two exceptions spelled out in the Charter are
collective security pursuant to a Security Council decision (by virtue especially of Article 42 9) and individual or collective self-defense (consistent with
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Article 51 10). This chapter will focus on self-defense, namely, forcible countermeasures put in motion by States acting on their own (individually or collectively), in the absence of a binding Security Council decision obligating or authorizing them to behave in such a fashion.
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, the right of self-defense can
only be invoked in response to an "armed attack." The choice of words in Article 51 is deliberately restrictive. The phrase "armed attack" is not equivalent to
"aggression" (a much broader and looser term, used, e.g., in Article 39 pertaining to the powers ofthe Security Councilll). An armed attack is actually a particular type of aggression. This is borne out by the French text, which speaks of
"une agression armee. " The expression "armed attack" denotes the illegal use of
armed force (i.e., recourse to violence) against a State.
For an illegal use offorce to acquire the dimensions ofan armed attack, a minimal threshold has to be reached. Since Article 2(4) ofthe Charter forbids "use of
force" and Article 51 allows taking self-defense measures only against an "armed
attack," a gap is discernible between the two stipulations. 12 The gap is due to the
fact that an illegal use of force not tantamount to an armed attack may be
launched by one State against another, but then (in the absence of an armed attack) self-defense is not an option available to the victim. Logically and pragmatically, the gap has to be quite narrow, inasmuch as "there is very litde effective
protection against states violating the prohibition of the use of force, as long as
they do not resort to an armed attack. "13 Ifa victim State is barred from respondingwith counter-force to force, this ought to be confined to the sphere ofapplication of the ancient apothegm de minimis non curat lex. In other words, all that
the gap conveys is that the illicit use of force has to be of sufficient gravity.14
When the use of force is trivial-say, a few stray bullets are fired across a frontier-no armed attack can be alleged to have occurred. 15 In that case, there is no
room for forcible counter-measures ofself-defense. 16 By contrast, when the use
offorce is of sufficient gravity, an armed attack is in progress even ifit is characterized by small magnitude. Au fond, whenever a lethal result to human beings-or serious destruction to property-is engendered by an illegal use of
force by State A against State B, that use offorce will qualify as an armed attack.
The right to employ counter-force in self-defense against State A can then be invoked by State B (and, as we shall see infra, also by State C).
To better understand the legal position, it is necessary to distinguish between
an armed attack, on the one hand, and an ordinary breach of international
law-or even a mere unfriendly act-on the other.
State A can commit an unfriendly act against State B without thereby being in
breach of any binding norm of international law. Such unfriendly conduct by
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State A is liable to upset State B. It may cause the latter psychological embarrassment or even material harm in the political, diplomatic, or economic arena. Yet,
as long as no breach of international law is committed, State B does not possess
any legal standing (jus standI) for objecting to the conduct of State A.
Acts that may highlight the phenomenon of unfriendly acts, carrying with
them no connotations ofinfringement by State A ofinternationallaw, are: (i) refusal to permit an official visit of State A by the Head of State B;i7 (ii) a notification that a member of the diplomatic staff of State B accredited to State A is
persona /lon grata; 18 (iii) the prohibition of the import of certain goods from State
B into State A (absent treaty commitments to the contrary);19 and (iv) espionage
carried out by clandestine agents of State A.20 The fact that, strictly speaking, all
these activities-and similar ones in the same vein-are legal (albeit unfriendly)
does not mean that State B is completely helpless in terms of potential response.
State B may opt to indulge in "retorsion" by taking equally legai yet unfriendly
steps (such as a reciprocal expulsion of diplomats sent by State A).21
A breach of international law transcends unfriendliness, crossing the red line
of illegality. If State A ignores the immunity from local jurisdiction enjoyed by
duly accredited diplomatic agents ofState B;22 ifState A's trawlers fish in the exclusive economic zone off the coast of State B;23 if State A fails to extradite a fugitive from State B notwithstanding clear-cut obligations in a treaty concluded
by them-State A will bear international legal responsibility vis-a.-vis State B. In
keeping "vith the international law of State responsibility, "[t]he injured State is
entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act full reparation in the form of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, either singly or in
combination. "24
Seeking reparation, State B-as the injured party-may present a legal claim
against State A before any international court or tribunal which may be vested
"vith jurisdiction over the dispute. Alternative avenues are also open. State B is
always free to bring the dispute with State A to the attention of the Security
Council [under Article 35(1) of the Charter25]. The Council may then recommend appropriate methods of adjustment [pursuant to Article 36(1)26] or even
determine the existence of a threat to the peace (in compliance with the
above-mentioned Article 39).27 Acting on its own, State B may also apply
non-forcible reprisals against State A28 (e.g., by declining to extradite a fugitive
from State A under the same treaty provision). A reprisal differs from retorsion in
that the act in question (non-extradition) would have been illegal-in light of
the treaty obligations postulated-but for the prior illegal act of State A.29
Whichever channel of response is chosen by State B against State A, the
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quintessential point is that, as a rule, the fact that State A incurs international responsibility towards State B does not create for State B a legitimate option to initiate force against State A. Even an ordinary violation of the UN Charter itself
does not excuse response by force.
The only time-consistent with the Charter-when State B (,vithout acting
at the behest ofthe Security Council) may lawfully wield force against State A, in
response to an illegal act by State A, is when that illegal act amounts to an armed
attack and the counter-measures can be appropriately subsumed under the heading of self-defense.

Computer Network AHacks (CNAs)
The scientific and technological revolution, which has rendered the computer ubiquitous, has also "changed the scope and pace ofbattle."3o This is evident to all where the computer serves as an instrument of command, control,
communications, and intelligence (not to mention simulation, surveillance,
sensors, and innumerable other military purposes). But the modern computer
can also become a weapon in itselfby being aligned for attack against other computer systems serving the adversary. A "computer network attack" (CNA) can
occur either in wartime-in the midst of on-going hostilities-or in peacetime.
The former situation is governed by the jus in bello and does not come ,vithin the
scope of the present paper. The question to be analyzed here is the latter. More
specifically, the fulcrum of our discussion is whether a CNA mounted in peacetime may be categorized as an armed attack, thus justifying forcible countermeasures of self-defense in compliance with the jus ad bellum.
A CNA is often defined inadequately as disrupting, denying, degrading, or
destroying either information resident in a computer network or the network itsel£31 This definition is rooted in a presupposition that a CNA is no more than a
device to counter the antagonist's electronic capabilities. Had the definition
been legally binding-or had it factually mirrored the whole gamut of the technical capabilities of the computer-the likelihood of a CNA ever constituting a
full-fledged armed attack would be scant. However, whereas CNAs recorded
heretofore have admittedly been circumscribed to operations of intrusion and
disruption, it would be extremely imprudent to extrapolate current restraints
into the years ahead. A credible forecasting of future developments must start
from the indisputable premise that potential CNAs (by feeding false messages
into a target computer system) may also encompass grievous sabotage, designed
to leave behind a trail of death and devastation through induced e:h"plosions and
other malicious "malfunctions."32
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The determination whether or not an anned attack has taken place-so as to
justify response by way of self-defense-does not necessarily depend on the
choice of weapons by the attacking party. The International Court ofJustice
aptly commented, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 1996, that the
provision ofArticle 51 does not refer to specific weapons; it applies to anyanned
attack, regardless of the weapon employed. 33 Of course, the detonation of
weapons ofmass destruction (say, nuclear warheads) makes it easier to stigmatize
the strike as an anned attack. Still, what counts is not the specific type of ordnance, but the end product ofits delivery to a selected objective. Mter all, even
unsophisticated pernicious tools-like the poisoning of wells in a desert
area-may give rise to exceedingly grave results.
From a legal perspective, there is no reason to differentiate between kinetic
and electronic means of attack. A premeditated destructive CNA can qualify as
an anned attack just as much as a kinetic attack bringing about the same-or similar-results. The crux of the matter is not the medium at hand (a computer
server in lieu of, say, an artillery battery),34 but the violent consequences of the
action taken. If there is a cause and effect chain between the CNA and these violent consequences, it is immaterial that they were produced by high rather than
low technology.
When a CNA emanates from within the territory of the same country in
which the target is located (assuming that no foreign State is involved in the operation and no a~empt is made to route the attack through a conduit abroad),
this is a matter that in principle can-and should-be regulated by the domestic
law of that country. Generally speaking, subject to few exceptions (see the next
section), international law comes into play only at a point when the CNA turns
into a cross-border operation.
Even in a cross-border scenario, CNAs are not all ofthe same nature. It is necessary to distinguish between four discrete rubrics of CNAs originating from
State A and directed against State B, depending on whether they are unleashed
by: (i) individual computer hackers who are residents of State A, acting on their
own initiative for whatever personal motive (benign or otherwise) without any
linkage to the government of State A; (ii) terrorists35 based in State A, acting on
behalf of any chosen "cause" inimical to State B, unsupported by the government of State A; (iii) terrorists overtly or covertly sponsored by the government
of State A; and (iv) official organs-either military or civilian-of the government of State A.
The first two categories usually call for coercive action by the proper authorities of State A itself, with a view to precluding or terminating hostile acts conducted from within its territory by hackers or terrorists against State B. The
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International Court ofJustice proclaimed, in the Corfu Channel case of1949, that
every State is under an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights ofother States. "36 In implementing this international obligation, State A should take resolute steps to suppress the perpetration of hostile activities from within its territory against State B-optimally by
preventing these acts from materializing, but minimally by prosecuting offenders after the acts have already been committed. If the government of State A fails
to do what it is supposed to, State B (as we shall see infra) can take certain exceptional counter-measures unilaterally.
When terrorists are sponsored by State A, they may be deemed "defacto organs" of that State.37 "[T]he imputability to a State of a terrorist act is unquestionable if evidence is provided that the author of such act was a State organ
acting in that capacity. "38 When State A chooses to operate against State B at one
remove--pulling the strings of a terrorist organization (not formally associated
with the governmental apparatus), rather than activating its regular armed
forces-this does not diminish one iota from the full international responsibility
of State A for the acts taken and their consequences, provided that "it is established" that the terrorists were "in fact acting on behalf of that State."39
The International Court ofJustice, in the Nicaragua case of 1986, e).-plicitly
held that an armed attack encompasses not only action by regular armed forces
but also the employment of"irregulars."4o Granted, not every detail in this delicate area is universally agreed upon. The majority of the Court in the Nicaragua
Judgment added that the mere supply of arms (or providing logistical and other
support) to armed bands cannot be equated \vith armed attack,41 whereas Judges
Schwebel and Jennings sharply dissented on this point. 42 Be it as it may, there is a
consensus that when State A goes beyond logistical support and dispatches a terrorist group to do its bidding against State B, State B can invoke self-defense
against State A.
In 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia pronounced, in the Tadic case, that acts performed by members of a military or paramilitary group organized by a State "may be regarded as
acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts. "43 The Tribunal
concentrated on the subordination ofthe group to overall control by the State. It
opined that the State does not have to issue specific instructions for the direction
ofevery individual operation, nor does it have to choose concrete targets. 44 Terrorists can thus act quite autonomously and still stay de facto organs of the controlling State.
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The most crucial flow ofevents stems from a CNA undertaken overtly by official government organs. The intrusion of the organs of State A into the computer systems of State B may have a whole range of purposes and outcomes, for
instance:
(i) Espionage. As indicated supra, espionage activities conducted by
clandestine agents are merely unfriendly acts. In singular circumstances, official espionage is openly acknowledged by a State;45 the
question whether the act can then be viewed as a violation ofinternational law is debatable. 46 In any event, espionage per se does not
constitute an armed attack.
(ii) Disruption of communications and digitized services through the
induced failure of computer systems, without causing human casualties or significant destruction of property. This is a CNA, but
since the act (whether merely unfriendly or a transgression ofinternational law) does not entail sufficiendy grave consequences, the
conclusion is the same.
(iii) Fatalities caused by loss of computer-controlled life-support systems; an extensive power grid outage (electricity blackout) creating
considerable deleterious repercussions; a shutdown of computers
controlling waterworks and dams, generating thereby floods of inhabited areas; deadly crashes deliberately engineered (e.g., through
misinformation fed into aircraft computers), etc. The most egregious case is the wanton instigation ofa core-meltdown ofa reactor
in a nuclear power plant, leading to the release ofradioactive materials that can result in coundess casualties if the neighboring areas
are densely populated. 47 In all these cases, the CNA would be
deemed an armed attack.
A salient point is that an excessive computer dependency creates a special
vulnerability.48 The more technologically advanced-and, therefore, computer
reliant-a State is, the more susceptible it is to a paralyzing CNA. Overall, State
A may be less developed scientifically and technologically than State B. 49 Yet,
the very advantage of State B becomes a debilitating burden once State A
manages to penetrate State B's electronic defenses. This, writ large, is the
scenario of a nuclear core meltdown. Through a CNA, State A-having no
nuclear capability of its own-can in a sense "go nuclear" by exploiting the
scientific and technological infrastructure of State B, thus turning the tables on
the target State. State B, as it were, provides the nuclear weapon against itself (the
weapon being triggered by agents of State A).
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CNAs against Private Individuals and Corporations
It must be appreciated that a computer system subjected to a CNA by State A
need not belong to the government, or even to any semi-governmental agency,
of State B. An attack may be carried out, e.g., inside US territory (or, for that
matter, vessels flying the American flag and aircraft registered in the US) against a
computer system operated by either a private individual or a non-governmental
entity. The American situation is perhaps the most acute, inasmuch as public
utilities in the US are privately owned, and, indeed, corporate America is the
principal manufacturer ofmilitary equipment, naval platforms, and aircraft serving the American armed forces. But anyhow, it is immaterial whether the civilian computer system under attack is operated by a civilian supplier or
sub-contractor of the Department ofDefense. Even if the CNA impinges upon
a civilian computer system which has no nexus to the military establishment
(like a private hospital installation), a devastating impact would vouchsafe the
classification of the act as an armed attack. There is no immanent difference between a CNA and a kinetic attack targeting ordinary civilian objects \vithin the
territory of State B. Needless to say, the bombing by State A of, e.g., an urban
population center (apart from being unlawful per se under international humanitarian law, by not being directed against a military objective50) constitutes an
armed attack, albeit not a single member of the armed forces ofState B is injured
in the air-raid. The same rule is applicable to a CNA.
Furthermore, a CNA-just like a kinetic use of force-by State A would
qualify as an armed attack against State Beven if the computer system inside the
territory of State B (including its vessels and aircraft) is operated by an individual
or a private corporation possessing the nationality of State C. A corporation, on
an analogy with an individual, has a distinct nationality (that of the State under
the laws of which it was incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered
office).51 But the foreign nationality of the corporate or individual operator of
the computer system under attack is irrelevant from the perspective ofState B, as
long as the CNA is carried out within its territory.
What happens when a CNA is inflicted by State A outside the territory of
State B, but it affects a computer system operated by State B or one ofits nationals (individual or corporate)? It goes without saying that a lethal kinetic strike
against a governmental installation of State B stationed outside its territory,
vessels, and aircraft-such as an embassy of State B in the capital city of State C
(or even State A)-will be deemed an armed attack against State B, notwithstanding the geographic disconnection from its territory. 52 This is also true ofan
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electronic attack against the computer system of State B's embassy in State C (or
in State A) culminating with fatalities or destruction of property.
The position differs when the target ofan armed attack (kinetic or electronic)
by State A is situated in State C, and any injury caused to State B or to its nationals is coincidental. In such a case, State B cannot regard itself as the genuine object of the armed attack. On the other hand, ifa destructive CNA is launched by
State A within the territorial boundaries of State C (or even State A) against a
computer system operated privately by nationals (individual or corporate) of
State B-and the target is specifically selected on account of that nationality-State B is entitled to consider the act an armed attack against itseI£ Thus, if
an eA'Plosion-inducing CNA strikes a computer operated by US citizens across
the ocean-and this is plainly done not at random but because of the American
nationality of the operators-the act may be deemed an armed attack against the
US (although perpetrated abroad). There are many instances in international relations in which nationals attacked abroad by State A have been protected or rescued by State B in the name of self-defense. 53 This is perfectly legitimate,
provided that the attack occurred owing to the bond of nationality existing between the victims and State B.54 Once more, there is no difference here between
an electronic and a kinetic attack.

Self-Defense Responses to CNAs
Just as there are variable settings for the commission of an armed attack by
State A in the form of a CNA, there are also several possible responses available
to State B in the exercise ofits right ofself-defense. The most obvious response is
"on-the-spot reaction, "55 where the computer network under attack strikes instantaneously back at the source of the CNA. The trouble, however, is that frequently the server which is seemingly the source of the CNA has only been
manipulated by the true assailants (who have routed their attack through it), and
s\vift responsive counter-measures against the intermediary conduit is liable to
be counterproductive, as well as unlawful. 56 Establishing the genuine identity of
the attacker-and attributing the act to the real (as distinct from apparent) actor-is a major challenge in the present stage of technological development (see
discussion infra).
On the whole, the most effective modality ofself-defense against an armed attack in the shape of a CNA is recourse to defensive armed reprisals, to wit, forcible counter-measures undertaken at a different time and place. Armed reprisals
as such are generally" considered to be unlawful" in peacetime. 57 But there is no
reason why armed reprisals cannot come within the framework of self-defense
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under the Charter. Armed reprisals can constitute a legitimate response to an
armed attack within the ambit of Article 51, provided that they are genuinely
defensive, namely, future-oriented (deterrent in character) and not
past-oriented (confined to punitive retaliation). 58 State practice definitely shows
that defensive armed reprisals are part and parcel of the arsenal ofStates subjected
to armed attacks. 59 Indeed, falling back on defensive armed reprisals has certain
built-in advantages. Above all, it gives State B an opportunity to review the facts
(and determine culpability) while considering options for response.
It should be borne in mind that defensive armed reprisals against a CNA can
be performed kinetically even though the original armed attack Gustifying them)
was executed electronically, and vice versa. Again, whatever is permitted (or
prohibited) when kinetic means ofwarfare are used is equally permitted (or prohibited) when the means employed are electronic; the rules of international law
are the same whatever the means selected for attack.
The ultimate type offorce stimulated by self-defense may amount to (or may
result in) war. 60 In the setting of CNAs, the outbreak of war as a countermeasure of self-defense would be rare. Due to the conditions precedent to the
waging of war as an exercise of self-defense (see discussion infra), war would
constitute a proper response to a CNA only in far-fetched scenarios (such as the
calculated prompting of a nuclear core meltdown).
Sometimes, State A-constrained by political or military considerations-would passively tolerate the use of its territory as a base for activities by
terrorists against State B, without actively sponsoring those activities or even encouraging them. 61 Such a tum of events would not cloak the terrorists ,vith a
mantle ofprotection from State B. "If a host country permits the use ofits territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks when it could shut those operations
down, an? refuses requests to take action, the host government cannot e},.-pect to
insulate its territory against measures ofself-defense. "62 As already epitomized in
the classical Caroline incident of 1837,63 State B may legitimately invoke
self-defense to exert counter-force within the territory of State A-targeting
armed bands which use that territory as a springboard for operations against State
B-when the host government remains inert. The present writer calls such a
mode of self-defense "extra-territorial law enforcement,"64 while others prefer
the term "state of necessity. "65 What counts, however, is the substance of the
law and not the formal appellation. The substance of the law in this respect relates to electronic, as much as kinetic, terrorism against State B originating in
State A.
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The Three Conditions of Self-Defense
Three cumulative conditions to the exercise of self-defense are wellentrenched in customary international law: (i) necessity, (ii) proportionality, and
(iii) immediacy. The first two conditions were articulated in the 1986 Nicaragua
]udgment,66 and reiterated in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 67
Immediacy, while glossed over in the Court's rendering of the law, is of equal
specific weight. 68
Necessity primarily denotes "the non-existence of reasonable peaceful alternative measures. "69 Differendy put, non-forcible remedies must either prove
futile ill limine or have in fact been exhausted in an unsatisfactory manner; the
upshot is that there is no effective substitute for the use offorce in self-defense. In
the conteh1: of a CNA, it is requisite to ascertain that the CNA is no accident, to
verify the genuine identity of the State-or non-State entity-conducting the
attack (so as not to jeopardize innocent parties), and to conclude that the use of
force as a counter-measure is indispensable. Should there be an opportunity to
setde the matter amicably through negotiations, these must be conducted in
good faith.7 0
The second condition is chiefly relevant to defensive armed reprisals undertaken in a situation "short of war." The counter-measures taken by State B
(kinetically or electronically) must not be out of proportion with the act
prompting them.7 1 A modicum of symmetry between force and counter-force-injury inflicted on State B by the armed attack versus damage sustained by State A by dint of the self-defense counter-measures-is called for.
Since CNAs are often discharged in a cluster-and inasmuch as each one of
them, when examined in isolation, may appear to have only a minor
("pin-prick") adverse effect, yet, when assessed in their totality, the results may
be calamitous-the question is whether defensive armed reprisals may be undertaken in proportion to the cumulative effect of the sequence ofattacks. 72 The issue, which ordinarily arises in the face of assaults by terrorists, is not free of
difficulties.73 But there is some authority for the position that a State suffering
from a series ofsmall-scale attacks is permitted to respond to them aggregately in
a single large-scale forcible counter-measure. 74 This would equally apply to
CNAs.
The balance between the quantum of force and counter-force, which is the
key to the legitimacy of defensive armed reprisals, is not germane to war as the
ultimate manifestation of self-defense in response to an armed attack. 75 Once
war is in progress, it may be fought to the limit (subject to the exceptions and
qualifications decreed by international humanitarian law), and there is no
109

Computer Network Attacks and Self~Defense
mandatory correspondence between the scale of force expended by the opposing sides. 76 The meaning ofproportionality in the concrete circumstances ofwar
is that the use of comprehensive counter-force in the exercise of self-defense
must be warranted by the critical character of the original armed attack.77 Once
the vital justification of a war of self-defense by State B against State A is recognized, there is no additional need to ponder the defensive disposition of every
single measure taken by State B. From the outset ofa war ofself-defense until its
termination (which is not to be confused with the suspension of hostilities
through a cease-fire78), the legitimacy of every instance of the use of force by
State B against State A is covered by the jus ad bellum (albeit not necessarily by the
jus in bello). Admittedly, where CNAs are concerned, a war of self-defense
would be vindicated as an appropriate response only in outre circumstances (such
as the catastrophic event of a CNA-induced nuclear core meltdown).
Immediacy intrinsically suggests that the activation of self-defense countermeasures must not be too tardy. Still, this condition is construed "broadly."79
There may be a time-lag of days, weeks, and even months between the original
armed attack and the sequel of self-defense. The delay may be particularly glaring after a CNA, since in cyberspace activities can produce reverberations
around the world "in the time that it takes to blink an eye."80 Still, lapse of time
is almost unavoidable when-in a desire to fulfill the letter and spirit of the condition of necessity-a slow process of diplomatic negotiations evolves, \vith a
view to resolving the matter amicably.81

Interceptive Self-Defense
The gist ofArticle 51 of the Charter is that there is no legitimate self-defense
sans an armed attack. All the same, an armed attack need not start with the opening offire on the aggrieved party. In fact, at times, it is the victim ofan armed attack who fires the first shot. For an obvious example, suffice it to postulate that
military formations commissioned by State A intentionally cross the frontier of
State B and then halt, positioning themselves in strategic outposts well \vithin
the territory of State B (the movement of Pakistani troops into Indian Kashmir
in 1999 is a good case in point82). If the invasion takes place in a region not easily
accessible and lightly guarded, it is entirely conceivable that some time would
pass before the competent authorities of State B grasp what has actually transpired. In these circumstances, it may very well ensue that the armed forces of
State B would be instructed to dislodge from their positions the invading contingents belonging to State A, and that fire be opened first by soldiers raising the
banner ofState B. Nevertheless, since the international frontier has been crossed
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by the military units ofState A without the consent ofState B, State A cannot relieve itself of responsibility for an armed attack.
As a matter of fact (and law), an armed attack may be viewed as a foregone
conclusion even though no fire has been opened (as yet) and no international
frontier has been crossed. Thus, hypothetically, had the Japanese aircraft en
route to Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, been intercepted and shot down
over the high seas by US air forces,Japan would still have incurred responsibility
for the armed attack that triggered the Pacific War.83 A more up-to-date scenario would be that ofa missile site whose radar is locked on to a target in preparation for fire. 84 The linchpin question in analyzing any situation is whether the
die has been cast. Resort to counter-force in the exercise of self-defense cannot
be purely preventive in nature, inasmuch as threats alone do not form an armed
attack. Still, ifit is blatant to any unbiased observer that an armed attack is incipient or is on the verge of beginning, the intended victim need not wait impotently for the inescapable blow; the attack can legitimately be intercepted.
Interceptive (in contradistinction to anticipatory) self-defense comes within the
purview of permissible self-defense under the Charter. The theme of interceptive self-defense is apposite to a CNA when an intrusion from the outside into a
computer network has been discovered, although, as yet, it is neither lethal to
any person nor tangibly destructive of property. The issue is whether the intrusion can plausibly be construed as the first step of an inevitable armed attack,
which is in the process of being staged (analogous to the detection of attack aircraft en route to their objectives). It is a matter ofevaluation on the ground ofthe
information available at the time of action (including warnings, intelligence reports, and other data), reasonably interpreted. 8S

The Attribution of CNAs to a State
Reference has already been made to the problem ofattribution to State A ofa
CNA as an armed attack for which responsibility devolves on that State. As observed, in the present state of the art, it is often by no means clear who originated
the CNA. The inability to identify the attacker undermines in practice the theoretical entitlement of State B to resort to forcible counter-measures in selfdefense. 86 State B must not rush headlong to hasty action predicated on reflexive
impulses and unfounded suspicions; it has no choice but to withhold forcible response until hard evidence is collated and the state of affairs is clarified, lest the
innocent be endangered. However, the following points should be recalled:
(i) The same problem arises in many other situations, for instance
when acts of terrorism are committed kinetically. Frequently,
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either the perpetrators of the terrorist attack act anonymously-leaving no signature-or those "taking credit" are unfamiliar. Since States sponsoring terrorism usually try to conceal their
role: holding such States accountable for their misdeeds may be
fraught with great difficulties. 87 Prior to determining its options in
combating terrorism, the victim State must establish a linkage between the terrorists and their sponsoring State. 88 CNAs invite a
similar approach.
(ii) Not always is attribution shrouded in doubt for long. In the past,
wars began with bombings and bombardments. In the future, they
are increasingly likely to start with CNAs. But recourse to a CNA
does not mean that the enemy wishes to remain incognito indefinitely. It is within the realm of the possible that a CNA will be
merely the precursor of a wave of later attacks, which will be
mounted with traditional means and be easily traceable to an irrefutable source. Hence, it would be a mistake to assume that a CNA
inevitably manifests an attempt at deception and perfidy. The CNA
may be designed merely to achieve surprise and cause temporary
havoc, without trying to hide the identity of the perpetrator for a
prolonged stretch of time.
(iii) Future advances in technology are likely to make it much easier to
identify the attacker, just as current-unlike past-technology enables the immediate registration of the source of an incoming telephone call (although, patendy, identification of that source does
not conclusively establish which person is actually making the telephone call; the same is true of the user of a computer).

Collective Self-Defense
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, collective-no less than individual-self-defense is permissible against an armed attack. The rule does not discriminate between different classes of armed attacks, and therefore it pertains
inter alia to a CNA crossing the threshold ofan armed attack. The right to collective self-defense means that any third State in the world89 (State C) is free to join
State B in bringing forcible measures to bear against State A, with a view to repelling an armed attack. The occurrence of an armed attack by State A against
State B as a conditio sine qua non to the exercise of collective self-defense against
State A by State C was underscored by the International Court ofJustice in the
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Nicaraglla case. 90 The majority ofthe Court further held that State C may not exercise that right unless and until State B has first declared that it has been subjected
to an armed attack by State A.91 This dictum has been cogendy challenged in a dissent by Judge Jennings,92 but it may have some merit against the background ofa
CNA. Certainly, States B and C must see eye to eye on the identification of an
elusive attacker. State C is enjoined from taking collective self-defense action
against State A ifState B (the immediate target) declines to confirm that State A is
indeed accountable for a CNA constituting an armed attack.
The exercise of collective self-defense in conformity with the Charter is a
right and not a duty. The right can be transformed into a duty should States Band
C become contracting parties to a mutual assistance treaty or a treaty of guarantee,
and afortiori to a military alliance. 93 Thus, if State B happens to be a member of
NATO, other members of the alliance are expected to extend military aiCl when an
armed attack occurs against it (within certain geographic bounds).94 But there is no
need for a collective self-defense treaty to exist between State B and State C.
State C is competent to act spontaneously~ppraising events as they unfold~nd
it can do so whether the armed attack against State B is kinetic or electronic.

The Supervision of the Security Council
Article 51 of the Charter sets forth that the right of self-defense may be exercised until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Under the article, a State invoking self-defense
must immediately report to the Council what steps it has taken, and these steps
do not diminish from the authority of the Council to take any action it deems
necessary. As the International Court of Justice enunciated in the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, the "requirements ofArticle 51 apply whatever the
means offorce used in self-defence."95 There is thus no difference between kinetic and electronic counter-measures.
Three thorny aspects of the Security Council's supervisory powers deserve to
be mentioned. First, as a matter offact, "[r]elatively few communications have
been circulated expressly to meet the Charter obligation to report immediately
to the Council on measures taken in the exercise ofthe right ofindividual or collective self-defence after an armed attack has occurred (Article 51). "96 As a matter oflaw, however, a failure to report to the Security Council about engaging in
self-defense against a CNA may be perilous. In its Judgment in the Nicaragua
case, the majority of the Court implied that a State may be precluded from relying on the right of self-defense ifit fails to comply with the requirement of reporting to the Council. 97 Judge Schwebel dissented, holding that the reporting
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duty is a procedural matter and that therefore nonfeasance must not deprive the
State concerned of its substantive cardinal right to self-defense. 98 The dissent is
quite persuasive, but the majority's position cannot simply be disregarded.
Second, the Security Council's record since its inception is not such as to instill
much confidence in the likelihood of its taking the necessary remedial action for
the maintenance of international peace and security, thus avoiding any further
need of unilateral self-defense against an armed attack. Once the Council's inaction was largely due to the Cold War and the abuse of the veto power by Permanent Members, each voting in tandem with the political interests of the bloc
which it led or to which it belonged. Regrettably, even recent permutations in
Big Power politics have not revived the faith in the Security Council's role as an
above-the-fray arbiter of all armed conflicts in the international community.
Third, it is by no means clear what sort of resolution adopted by the Security
Council would-divest States of the right to embark upon unilateral use offorce in
self-defense against an armed attack. Surely, the Council is fully empowered to
override specious claims to self-defense and adopt a legally binding decision to the
effect that allegedly defensive measures must stop forthwith. But this does not
mean that "any measure" adopted by the Council "would preempt selfdefense."99 Short of an explicit decree by the Council to discontinue the use of
force, the State acting in self-defense retains its right to do so until the Council has
taken measures which have actually "succeeded in restoring international peace
and security."100 Only effective measures that would not leave the victim State
defenseless can terminate or suspend the exercise of the right of self-defense. 101

Conclusion
The introduction of any new weapon into the arsenal of inter-State conflict
raises first and foremost the issue of its legality. pnder Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I (of 1977) to the Geneva Conventions, any State adopting (or even
developing) a new weapon must first determine whether or not it is prohibited
by international law; 102 this norm appears to reflect customary international
law. 103 CNAs are not incorporated in any present list ofproscribed weapons under the lex lata. Evidently, there is a separate issue de legeftrenda whether mankind would not be better offby legally banning them altogether. The dilemma
will probably be debated with growing intensity as the incidence ofCNAs leaves
their mark on the evolution of armed conflict.
The novelty of a weapon-any weapon-always baffles statesmen and
lawyers, many of whom are perplexed by technological innovations. It is
perhaps natural to believe that a new weapon cannot easily intermesh ,vith the
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pre-existing international legal system. In reality, after a period of gestation, it
usually dawns on belligerent parties that there is no insuperable difficulty in applying the general principles and rules ofinternational law to the novel weapon
(subject to some adjustments and adaptations, which crystallize in practice). It
can scarcely be denied that, unless legally excluded in advance, CNAs are almost
bound to playa pivotal role as a first-strike weapon in the commencement offuture hostilities. The challenge is to study now the most efficacious means of response to this ominous prospect.
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